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It's all about the design with this purse. A circular bag is an impressive design that elevates your outfit to a more elegant look. However, large bags in different textures, colors, and shapes are the chic trend that merges functionality with a classic fashion sense. See also:. Chain Straps.
Necklace Bags. Envelope Bag. Bright Colors. Mini-Shoulder Bags. Circular Bags. Fashion 7 Fashion Trends Everyone Will Be Wearing in From loungewear to wide-legged jeans, boost your wardrobe in the with these top trends. Recommended posts for you. The term of office was extended by a law of the House of Representatives. President Makarios distanced himself from his earlier enosis convictions in his presidential campaign and argued for the independence of Cyprus.
He declared that Enosis was wishable but independence was possible. His opponent was the psychiatrist Takis Evdokas who was campaigning for Enosis. Makarios won the election. Following the death of Makarios in , the then President of the House of Representatives, Spyros Kyprianou, assumed duties temporarily until elections.
In the election, Glafkos Klerides was backed by his party, Democratic Rally whereas Spyros Kyprianou was backed by the other Greek Cypriot parties. Following the kidnapping of Kyprianou's son, Achilleas, Klerides did not run for the election and Kyprianou won. Kyprianou was reelected in the presidential elections of that year. By , AKEL was not satisfied with Kyprianou's policies, especially his position in negotiations see Cyprus dispute for more and the partnership collapsed.
AKEL found its new candidate for the election in George Vasiliou who managed to get to the second round of elections together with Glafkos Klerides. Kyprianou did not get enough votes. With the added support of EDEK , whose candidate Vasos Lyssaridis did not do very well in the first round, Vasiliou won the second round.
While the Democratic Rally had been supporting Vasiliou in negotiating the Ghali set of ideas, as the elections were approaching it started criticising Vasiliou for not demanding enough. At the same time a partnership of Kyprianou's democratic party and Lyssaridis's EDEK was rejecting the spirit of the Ghali ideas all together and argued that both Vasiliou and Klerides were equally willing to compromise.
The partnership received strong support by the Church and its candidate was Paschalis Paschalidis. Paschalidis did not make it to the second round, however the democratic party made an agreement with Klerides and supported him. The main issue of the election campaign was the purchase of S antiaircraft missiles from Russia. Klerides won the election. For the election, EDEK leader Yiannakis Omirou declared himself candidate and the democratic rally initially backed him.
Because of the course of negotiations Clerides asked to remain president for another couple of years, so the democratic rally backed him. The leader of the latter, Tassos Papadopoulos was chosen as a candidate. In the meantime the attorney general Alekos Markides disagreed with his party, Democratic Rally and ran as an independent candidate. Papadopoulos won from the first round. The parliamentary elections were contested by three parties and a number of independent candidates. No parliamentary elections were held in because of the prevailing intercommunal tension.
Five parties contested the 5 July elections. The third parliamentary elections took place on 5 September , two years after the Turkish invasion. The fourth parliamentary elections took place on 24 May The fifth parliamentary elections took place on 8 December Following a law passed by the House of Representatives the number of seats allocated to the Greek Cypriot community was increased from 35 to The number of Turkish Cypriot seats was raised from 15 to His candidature was supported by his party and by the Democratic Party.
The sixth parliamentary elections took place on 19 May The seventh parliamentary elections took place on 26 May The new voting system encouraged the participation of more parties in the elections. Constitution of Cyprus has no mention of referendum as of The only referendum to take place in independent Cyprus was a referendum on the Annan Plan which was held both in the Republic of Cyprus and the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 24 April Before Cypriot independence there was also a Cypriot Enosis referendum in , which was unofficial and was held in Greek Orthodox churches.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. Learn how and when to remove these template messages. This article needs to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.
March This article is written like a personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states a Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. January Learn how and when to remove this template message. Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus dispute Law of Cyprus Taxation.
House of Representatives President : Demetris Syllouris. Supreme Court of Cyprus. Presidential: Legislative: European: Administrative divisions. Foreign relations. Other countries. Main article: Cypriot presidential election.
Main article: Cypriot legislative election. Retrieved 17 June Parliament of Cyprus. Ministry of Interior. European Court of Human Rights. Philenews in Greek. Archived from the original PDF on Retrieved Elections and referendums in Cyprus. Book Category Asia portal. European Union.
A Democratic sweep is seen as the surest path to massive stimulus to help revive an economy decimated by the pandemic that has killed nearly , Americans. A stimulus deal could lift shares, fuel a long-awaited rotation to economically sensitive value stocks and accentuate trends of a weaker dollar and steeper yield curve.
Beyond any near-term market boost, however, a Democratic sweep poses concerns for stock investors. A Biden win could also be negative for the dollar, if his administration brings a calmer tone to negotiations with China and other trade partners which boosts growth prospects for other countries. To be sure, since the election of Trump, who ushered in corporate tax cuts that supported equities and imposed trade tariffs that led to volatility, the U.
At the end of the day, investors just want some certainty. February 10, Facebook Twitter Instagram Youtube. Primary Menu. A Biden win could spur a run on stocks. But in the run-up to the vote, analysts have pointed to concern about over-confidence in a Biden win, and are mindful of the violent asset-price swings in when investors were expecting a Hillary Clinton victory.
Lacking a clear result, investors would likely flock to safe-haven assets, such as gold and U. Treasuries as well as perhaps the Japanese yen and U. Police looking for three men after bakery robbed. Coronavirus: Citizens service centre, post office closed.
The United States cannot therefore be hard-line on every front with Turkey. Nor can U. The United States and Europe can therefore seek to coordinate to signal clear red lines and credible responses to deter further Turkish escalation. In order to have an effect, these responses must be significant and must be enforced, but they should ideally be easily reversible. Beyond attempting deterrence, the United States should engage in firm transactionalism with Turkey, seeking to slow escalatory cycles that cannot be stopped, bureaucratize what have too often been emotional public disputes, and compartmentalize among the many discrete disagreements the countries face.
Taken together, the goal should be to put the relationship with Turkey on ice—preserving institutional ties where possible—in the hope that relations can be more meaningfully revived in the future. The United States should prepare by building partnerships in Europe to multiply leverage, by drawing red lines, and by proactively establishing lines of communication and deconfliction so that this escalation does not come as a surprise.
The Biden administration will inherit a U. Turkey has worked hard to develop its domestic defense production, including armed drones used to devastating effect in the recent fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Turkey helped its close ally Azerbaijan take back disputed territory lost decades prior to mutual rival Armenia.
Ankara has also made significant new maritime claims in disputed waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, leading to severe tensions with Greece, Cyprus, and France. To many in the U. This view has led many U. The resulting Trump-era approach to Turkey was incoherent, fragmented between the deliberate moves of some government officials to hedge U.
But Trump threw gasoline on the fire. With the United States absent from its traditional role mediating and arbitrating disputes—however unevenly it had previously done so—regional actors were more willing to throw their weight around. This assertiveness often came in hard security terms through direct military interventions or brazen proxy deployments—and disturbingly often included the use of U.
Wider trends around the use of proxies and drones, offering a measure of deniability and lowering the costs for aggressors, also played a role in this regional militarization. President Biden is likely to reverse many of these trends. This, in turn, will likely mean a resumption of the slow adjustment of U. Yet Biden is unlikely to lurch into a reflexively punitive approach toward Turkey; a more useful way to think about the prospects is to focus on what closing the gap between the professional ranks of the U.
Before getting into the details of these shifts and potential flashpoints in U. Fourth, Biden will certainly reinforce the U. Major sources of uncertainty complicate this general picture. It is assumed that the Biden administration will take a harder line toward Russia, but the extent of this shift is not yet clear and will influence decisions on Turkey, Syria, Libya, Iran, and NATO.
Congress adds an additional layer of complexity in trying to predict U. But above all, the major question is how Turkey will respond if the Biden administration pushes a little harder than Ankara has grown used to. Despite these sources of uncertainty, there are some predictable flashpoints in the U. They fall into three broad categories: 1 human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; 2 defense procurement and strategic alignment; and 3 regional conflicts and revanchism.
In the area of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, the picture is bleak. Indeed, the fact that things have deteriorated so far is one reason this set of issues can easily raise tensions but is unlikely to be the spark for an outright rupture in relations. Traditionally, U. But the new administration will have to weigh whether to truly prioritize these concerns over the realpolitik imperatives of managing the crises roiling the region.
Recent dynamics raise new questions: If Turkey is seen as an unreliable partner on regional issues or in confronting Russia, will the United States be more direct in its criticism? And has the United States lost sight of its fundamental interest in a stable, democratic Turkey—and how that desired stability flows from functioning democratic institutions? Indeed, the violent response to the Gezi Park protests in is an often-overlooked part of the breakdown in U.
Of the roughly 20 Americans imprisoned in Turkey, 12 two prominent cases have been resolved: Turkish-American scientist Serkan Golge has now served his sentence after a sham trial, while pastor Andrew Brunson was released after intense pressure and sanctions from the U. The first decision point could therefore come on Armenian Remembrance Day on April 24, around which vigorous lobbying by the Armenian diaspora, Congress, and the Turkish government over whether to label the atrocities a genocide will once again culminate.
It could be an early hint as to the tone Biden will take with Turkey, and Ankara will likely interpret it as such. The law came into effect in and is aimed at stemming the flow of information on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, the use of which correlates with critical views of the Justice and Development Party AKP and has grown in importance as Turks have lost faith in the government-controlled mainstream media. Another issue likely to come to a head in is the trial of Turkish state-owned Halkbank for evading U.
District Court handling the Halkbank case. Regardless of when the sentence and fine is handed down, it is certain to provoke an angry response from Ankara. This has left the Turkish president in an unenviable position: If he backs down, his standing at home will suffer. If Halkbank rejects the fine at his behest, it could be banned from conducting financial transactions through U. An improvement in the rule of law could reassure wary investors.
But this is wishful thinking that ignores both recent Turkish actions and many years of precedent. Still, the Biden administration should revive U. Given the constraints outlined above, the United States should opt less for punitive tools, such as sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act, and focus more on constructive tools, such as support for civil society, reinvestment in public diplomacy, and a rhetorical shift to support for universal rights from the narrower religious concerns of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and President Trump.
The United States responded by ejecting Turkey from the F program, 37 a massive shared procurement effort due to bring Turkey manufacturing jobs and income, technological know-how, and a prestigious weapons system that provides far more effective and versatile home air defense than two batteries of Ss.
The S purchase put Turkey in violation of CAATSA, which, in Section , imposes sanctions on parties engaged in significant transactions with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors. The law requires the U. The possible sanctions range from mild, if symbolically important, steps like asset freezes and travel bans for Turkish officials to hugely consequential steps like the denial of licenses to import U. For much of his term, President Trump simply ignored the law. The U. Congress repeatedly tried to force the issue through its control of the defense budget.
The sanctions included a ban on U. Of the sanctions, the prohibition on granting U. It is also possible that Turkey could work around the restrictions by routing licenses through other entities, such as the Ministry of Defense, though the United States could adjust the sanctions in response. Overall, then, the sanctions were a further warning to Turkey meant to convey that the United States takes the issue seriously and is willing to go further; the refusal to sell Turkey Fs and the planned expulsion from the overall program remain the most substantial punitive actions taken to date.
The action in December saves President Biden from having to sanction a NATO ally as one of his first acts in office, which would have immediately locked him into a punitive cycle with Turkey. This was perhaps a factor prompting Congress to force the matter. First, both the administration and Congress will face pressing challenges in early that could knock Turkey down the list of priorities. As they themselves said, there is cooperation with Turkey in many areas.
We and they expect this to continue. But observers should be cautious. Ankara is likely now in a conciliatory phase, waiting to see what line the Biden administration will take. Biden and his team experienced this pattern in the Obama years; by the end, the Obama administration had settled on a firm, transactional approach to Ankara.
President Biden should therefore press Turkey to decide if it will be a full ally or continue the double game with Russia. If Turkey values its NATO membership and alliance cohesion, it should reverse its course by committing to mothball the Ss and not buy further Russian systems. In this context, as part of an effort to slow down the crisis, the United States could reconsider the merits of the working group proposal.
The United States was clearly opposed to the idea when it was part of a Turkish effort to avoid any response to the S delivery, to which most in the U. But now that Turkey has been putatively ejected from the F program and sanctioned under CAATSA, the idea might theoretically offer a way to prevent further escalation. The message would be that the United States has shown its willingness to sanction Turkey—and will escalate those sanctions if Ankara goes further down the path with Russia—but that Washington wants to find a way out of this mess, if possible.
There likely is not much harm in that from the U. But while this is the best course for long-term U. And nobody, neither West nor Russia, should or can ask us to choose. Patriot air defense systems into a now well-worn story of Turkish resilience and American betrayal. We are Turkey. The military-technical side seems no more promising. The S was a major purchase for Turkey, costing a significant share of its annual defense budget. Analysts point out that the S batteries are only useful if they are integrated into a wider air defense system, the exact step that NATO fears will bring potential Russian cyber intrusions and allow the radars to build detailed signatures of NATO aircraft; in other words, the working group is unlikely to uncover technical workarounds to get around the core political disagreement.
Either Turkey reverses course on the S, unlocking U. Despite the threat of further sanctions, Turkey may follow through on its threats to deepen military ties with Russia, despite being on opposite sides from Russia in conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, according to Russian state media, Ankara has already signed a contract for a second order of S batteries, 59 beyond the four previously contracted. Ankara would struggle to finance alternatives and would face the choice of buying expensive replacements from European, Russian, or Chinese manufacturers, hardly satisfying the desire for self-sufficiency.
Weighing the meager benefits—a Russian system without technology transfer—against the loss of the F and these severe additional risks, Turkish defense procurement decisions do not seem to make sense in rational, realist foreign policy terms. According to the French, Turkish ships escorting the cargo ship threatened the French ship to prevent the search.
Increasingly, influential NATO member states point out that the alliance was created to defend a democratic political order, despite its shortcomings on that front during the Cold War. Today, the alliance confronts autocracies that have adopted hybrid tactics designed to weaken democratic cohesion; a genuine commitment to democracy—and a stern line toward Moscow—is therefore nearly as important as military readiness was in the face of Soviet tanks.
The United States should not shy away from these conversations, uncomfortable as they may be within the alliance. These conversations are not the cause of alliance discord; they are a symptom of disagreements that already exist, and simply beginning to discuss responses provides leverage for those seeking to strengthen democratic resilience.
Of course, this is not a new issue. Ankara has always relied on energy imports, including large purchases from Russia. That work has continued, aside from a brief pause in work when Turkish-Russian tensions spiked over the shootdown of a Russian plane that strayed into Turkish airspace from Syria, 72 and licenses were recently issued for construction of the third unit of the plant, scheduled for completion in TurkStream is actually two pipelines, each with an annual capacity of Previous State Department guidance had exempted the TurkStream 2 pipeline—the second pipeline bringing Russian gas to Turkey for re-export to southeastern Europe.
But these Section sanctions targeting energy pipelines are discretionary, unlike the Section sanctions requiring a response to significant defense transactions with Russia. These discretionary sanctions are unlikely to materialize absent additional Turkish actions to deepen ties with Russia. Unlike with the S purchase, which threatens NATO assets and where Turkey seems to be pursuing closer ties with Moscow against its long-term interests, here, Ankara is likely just following commercial logic in its energy dealings.
As the Biden administration tries to rebuild ties with close allies such as Germany, it will have to weigh the broad potential impact of the sanctions and the difficulty of coordinating approaches to Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream 2. Some argue that Turkey could deepen its shift to LNG—including through deliveries from close ally Qatar and the United States—and meaningfully shift its energy axis away from Russia. There is also the question of who Turkey will partner with—if anyone—in exploiting the recently discovered Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea.
Taken together, then, could set Turkey on a multiyear course in both strategic military and energy terms. The many proxy conflicts raging around the Mediterranean littoral and the Middle East make the prospects for regional flashpoints less predictable but no less prevalent.
They will either understand this by the language of politics and diplomacy or by the bitter experiences … on the ground. The most direct segue from the strategic energy issues discussed above to this regional revanchism is in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has made major naval investments in the past decade and expects to add more than 20 warships, including a light carrier, in the next three years. Drilling by the international oil majors has been suspended until mid, and the resumption of any activities marks a possible flashpoint in the coming year.
Meanwhile, each Turkish deployment of drilling ships to the disputed areas prompts angry responses from the Greeks, Cypriots, and European Union, as well as expressions of concern from the United States. The dispute around Cyprus is part of a broader tussle over maritime delineation, EEZs, and energy rights that has drawn in the entire Eastern Mediterranean littoral.
The Turkish-Libyan deal bisected Greek waters, essentially ignoring the entire island of Crete, and was met with fury by the Hellenic community and the European Union. Exacerbated by tensions in Libya discussed later, all sides in this convoluted crisis have retreated to their corners.
France and Italy have conducted joint exercises with the Greek navy, in part to defend the interests of their respective oil majors, in whose drilling plots Turkey has conducted exploratory actions; and the UAE temporarily deployed fighters to Greek bases in Crete.
Turkey is increasingly isolated, though its actions—and the collapse of global energy prices—have likely undermined the commercial viability of the most ambitious Hellenic-Israeli plans. Cyprus and Greece are EU member states, and the crisis has therefore become a top-tier issue for Brussels. For Anastasiades, this is an existential issue, and Cyprus can hold up crucial EU business to secure forceful action.
The situation is bleak and primed for trouble this year. Germany has sought to play a mediating role in the dispute over Greek islands and Turkish-Greek maritime boundaries.